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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
LEARA ANN DE\TEREAUX,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.Case No. 8472
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,
a corporation, and HAROLD J.
McKEEVER,

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

(Numbers in p~arenthe'Ses refer to pages of the reoord.
The parties will be referred to here as they appeared in
the trial court.)

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This is an appeal by plaintiff from a judgment of no
cause of action ( 195) entered in favor of defendants notwithstanding a verdict was rendered by ,a jury in plaintiff's favor for $5,465.00 (190A).
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This is an action to recover for personal injuries
suffered by plaintiff in an automobile collision which
occurred on the north slope of Lindon Hill in Utah
County, State of Utah. Defendant ~IcKeever was an employee of defendant General Electric Company and was
driving his automobile in the course of his employment
(5). After a trial to a jury, a verdict was returned in
favor of plaintiff and against defendants, assessing general damages in the sum of $5,000.00 and special damages
in the sum of $465.00 (190A).
A judgment was entered May 25, 1955, in favor of
plaintiff on this verdict· Thereafter the court entered an
a1nended judgment cutting the special damages to $199.90
(190), leaving a total judgn1ent of $5,199.90 (191). Defendants moved the court to set aside the verdict and to
enter a judgment in favor of defendants in accordance
with their motion for a directed verdict and that if that
motion be denied to set aside the judgment and grant a
new trial (192). November 21, 1955, the trial court granted defendants' 1notion for a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict and denied the motion for a new trial (194).
Pursuant to this order .a judgn1ent "\Yas entered of no
cause of action against plaintiff. Fro1u this judgment
plaintiff appeals.
The review presented by this app·eal relates only to
defendants' liability. No question arises concerning damages. We will not discuss the injuries or damages which
plaintiff suffered. Suffice it to say that in the collision
she received injuries to her back, abdomen and head.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The scene of this case is laid in Utah County in and
between Provo and Orem, and on the highway a little
to the north. This action arise~s out of a collision between
defendants' northbound automobile as it ran into the left
side of plaintiff's automobile as she was making a "lT"
turn. This was on June 30, 1954 between 10:00 and
10:30 p.m.
Earlier that evening plaintiff discovered her husband's Packard car in front of the home of a Mrs. Fr,ances Smith in Provo (95)· After talking with the police,
plaintiff had this automobile towed to the Hilltop Garage
in Provo. When Mr. Devereaux learned, while .at work,
that his automobile had been towed away, he left work
(144). He vvent to the ho1ne of Mrs. Smith. She borrowed
an automobile and drove him to the garage (156). Mr.
Devereaux was getting his automobile as plaintiff drovPup (81). 1\{rs. Smith then left in the automobile she had
borrowed and lVIr. Devereaux then left in his own, vvhereupon plaintiff started in a northerly direction on the
highway leading from Provo to Orem. This was about
ten P.M. (81). Mr. Devereaux drove to the home of Mrs.
Smith and picked her up (156)· The next time plaintiff
saw Mr. Devereaux was in Oren1 in the vicinity of J(irk's
Drive-Inn. Mrs. Smith was in the automobile with him.
He drove or swung his .automobile at plaintiff's automobile a couple of times (82). Plaintiff decided to drive off
the highway on the right hand side (82). Mr. Devereaux
then drove his car in front of hers. She put on the brake
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and just barely hit the Packard on the left-hand side (83).
Mr. Devereaux stepped out of his automobile and came
tow.ards plaintiff. At that time a highway patrolman
passed by going in a northerly direction on the highway.
Plaintiff started her automobile after him, honking her
horn in an attempt to attract his attention (83). The
patrolman finally pulled over to the side of the road and
plaintiff did likewise (84). Plaintiff informed the officer
of the difficulty she had been having and he told her he
would take her back and for her to follo\Y him (84).
The officer, Charles H. Allred, testified ( 29) :
"A·

Yes sir. I took and planned an escort for the
lady, and told her that I would go back with
her to see that everything "~as safe, and to
follow my automobile after I had put the
controls on, and stay right behind me, and we
"\vould get a break in the traffic, and I would
escort her back to the City of Orem."

The controls \vere the big oscillating don1e lights on the
roof of the patrol car. This light "~.as red. It turns in all
directions and can be seen fron1 all directions ( 29). The
officer looked for safet-Y.
He did not drive out into the
•'
traffic until the drivers could discern his signals (30).
Automobiles both north and south bound, respected the
light and gave the officer the right of \Yay by stopping
(30-42). He then made a ~~rq' turn to proceed southerly.
At the time plaintiff drove over to the side of the
road, her lights were on and she did not turn the1n off
(85 ). With her signal lights, she signaled .a left-hand
turn. She looked both ways and did not see <:ln auto1noSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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bile. She went to make the turn and an automobile hit
her automobile on the left side between the door and
the rear fender (85). The officer testified he made the
turn and plaintiff attempted to follow behind hi1n. When
he had completed his turn, he heard the cr.ash as another
automobile \vas propelled into plaintiff's automobile (30).
At the tune of the crash, the officer was on the west side
of the highway in about the outside lane (39). He was
headed south and h.ad just completed the "U" turn and
vvas just west of two stopped automobiles when he heard
the crash- The officer did not see the collision or defendants' automobile before the crash ( 40).
Joseph L. Breeze, immediately before the collision,
was driving an auton1obile northerly in the second lane
of traffic from the center line for northbound vehicles.
As he approached this particular ,area, he saw a red light
on the side of the road about two or three hundred feet
ahead of him. He pulled over into the center lane (6G,67).
The red light started to turn around in the middle of the
road and he stopped to permit the turn to be made (67).
These happenings occurred on the slope of what is
known as Lindon Hill. The officer estimated th.at he
stopped about half way between the crest of the hill and
the bottom (36,37).
Defendant Mcl{eever lived in Salt Lake City anc1 was
an employee of defendant General Electric Company. He
had spent the afternoon and e.arly evening playing golf
at the Country Club in Provo. He played from two
o'clock until approximately eight or eight thirty. After
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he ca1ne into the club house he had a couple of drinks of
whiskey (134). He left the golf club about nine o'clock
and went to dinner. He left the restaurant at approximately ten o'clock and started north on highw.ay 91 towards Salt Lake City (135). He testified that he was
driving northward at approximately fifty miles an hour
when he came over the rise of a hill and then things happened so fast that his recollection w.as hazy (136). He
kne,v, as he was driving along, that he was approaching
a hill and he knew that there was 1nore danger in driving
to,vard a hill than 1nerely driving along a str.aight level
road ( 140) · When he reached the cre'St, he saw automobiles at an estilnated two hundred feet ahead of him (136,
140). He saw the officer's ear 'Yith the light on top
(140). He was driving in the lane closest to the middle
of the road. He observed a ear stopped in that lane
and turned to the right to avoid hitting it. He clipped it as
he passed and then collided with plaintiff's automobile
( 67,141).
Highway patrolman X eldon Evans 1nade measurelnents after the collision. Fron1 debris and brake marks
and n1arks fro1n that point to "~here the ears finally
came to rest, the officer deter1nined the location of the
point of impact. There is a drive"~ay east of the highway which appears on Exhibit 4. He placed the point of
ilnpact seven feet north of the north edge of this driveway
and seven feet east of the line dividing the two northbound traffic lanes (55). These lanes ,Yere twelve feet
'vide. Br:ake n1arks extended fron1 the point of impact
in a southerly direction for sixty feet. . .~ t the southerly
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point of these brake marks, the "'"Weistern most started
about a foot from the center line of the highway and
extended in ~a diagonal direction to the point of impact
in the eastern lane of northbound traffic (56). The officer estimated the point of impact to be from two to three
to four hundred feet from the crest of the hill ( 60).
Plaintiff's .automobile came to rest facing in an easterly direction forty-four feet north from the point of
i1npact to the side of the automobile and ten feet nine
inches east from the middle line of the northbound traffic
lanes to the rear of plaintiff's car (58). McKeever's autoInobile also came to rest heading in an easterly direction.
The side of his automobile was twenty feet north of the
point of imp.act. The rear end of his automobile was two
feet seven inches east from the middle line of the northbound traffic (57,58).
Patrolman Evans talked with McKeever at the scene
of the collision. 1\icKeever said that he was going betvveen fifty and sixty miles per hour and that he was within two hundred feet of the danger when he first noticed
it (52,53). The patrolman could smell alcohol on his
bre.ath. He staggered a little and his talk was a little
thick (53,54). Because of this, the patrolman questioned
him about drinking. He told the officer that he had gone
to Provo for supper and had a few drinks. He was asked
where he was and he stated that he was at Draper, and
that he remembered going past the point of the mountain
(53,54). The place where the collision occurred is some
twenty to twenty-five miles south of Draper.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS

POINT. I
PLAINTIFF WAS DENIED HER RIGHT TO A JURY
TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND
APPLICABLE AUTHORITIES.

POINT II
THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE INTRODU·CED
WHICH WOULD SUPPORT A FINDING THAT DEFENDANTS WERE NEGLIGENT IN THE OPERATION OF THE
AUTOMOBILE AND THAT SUCH NEGLIGENCE PROXIr./IATELY CAUSED PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING PLAINTIFF
GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGEN·CE AS A MATTER
OF LAW.
ARGU~IENT

POINT I
PLAINTIFF WAS DENIED HER RIGH'T TO A JURY
TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND
APPLICABLE AUTHORITIES.

The trial eourt subrnitted this ease to the jury for its
verdict. It returned a verdiet in favor of plaintiff. Thereafter the court granted defendants, n1otion for a judgrnent notwithstanding the verdict and entered judgn1ent
in favor of the defendant no cause of aetion. To support
this ruling it rnust be found that the evidenee \Vas entirely
insufficient to support .a finding in favor of plaintiff
and required a judgn1ent £or defendants. This rulingdenies to plaintiff her right to a jury trial.
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This Court in Stickle v. Union Pacific R. Co. (Utah)
251 p. 2d 867 (1952) made a splendid statement of the
right of a citizen to a trial by a jury. This. Court there
stated:
"The court should exercrse c.aution and forbearance in considering taking questions of fact
from the jury.
"In our democratic system, the people are the
repository of power whence the law is derived;
from its initiation and cre.ation to its final application and enforcement, the law is the expression of
their will. The functioning of a cross-section of
the citizenry as a jury is the method by which the
people express this will in the applic.ation of law to
controversies which arise under it. Both our constitutional and statutory provisions assure trial by
jury to citizens of this state.
"Courts, as final arbiters of law, could arrogate to themselves arbitrary and dangerous powers by presuming to determine questions of f.act
which litigants have a right to have passed upon
by juries. Part of the merit of the jury system is
its safeguarding against such arbitrary po,ver in
the courts. To the great credit of the courts of this.
country, they have been extremely reluctant to infringe upon this. right, and by leaving it unimp,aired have kept the administration of justice close
to the people. Of course, the rights of litigant~s
should not be surrendered to the arbitrary will of
juries without regard to whether there is a violation of legal rights as a basis for recovery. The
court does have a duty .and a responsibility of supervisory control over the action of juries which
is just as essential to the proper administration
of justice as the function of the jury itself. N eve~rSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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theless, we remain cognizant of the vi~al importance of the privilege of trial by jury In our system and deem it our duty to zealously protect and
preserve it."
Another excellent statement of the rule is found in
Newton v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 43 Utah 219, 134
Pac. 567, 570.
"Where, therefore, the circumstances are such
that it may reasonably be said that different
minds, in viewing and considering the evidence,
might arrive at different conclusions with respect
to whether or not the injured person exercised
ordinary care, the question Df negligence must of
necessity be determined as one of fact and not of
law- \Vhile the susbta~ce of the foregoing statement is often found in the books and may be said
to be a correct statement of the doctrine, yet such
statements often leave the reader in doubt whether
a given case falls within or without the doctrine.
But, notwithstanding this, it is ilnpossible to formulate a rule by which all cases can be determined.
"All that can be said is that, unless the question of negligence is free fron1 doubt, the court
cannot pass upon it as a question of law; that is,
if after considering all tl1e evidence and the inferences that may be deduced therefrom the court
is in doubt whether reasonable 1nen in viewing and
considering all the evidence, might arrive at different conclusions, then this very doubt determines the question to be one of fact for the jury
and not one of la'v for the court. The court can
pass upon the question of negligence only in clear
cases. All others 'Should be submitted to· the jury.
The reason of this is .apparent from the fact that
in this state all questions of fact are for the J·urv·

..
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1!
and therefore, unless it is clear that in viewing
and considering the evidence reasonable minds
might not arrive at different conclusions, the case
should go to the jury."
We submit the ruling of the court that the evidence
'vas insufficient and required 'a judgment for defendants,
constitutes a plain violation of plaintiff's right to a trial
by jury secured to her by the Constitution of the State
of Utah and by the foregoing authorities.
POINT. II
THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE INTR.ODUCED
WHICH WOULD SUPPORT A FINDING 'THAT DEFENDANTS WERE NEGLIGENT IN THE OPERATION OF THE
AUTOMOBILE AND THAT SUCH NEGLIGENCE PROXIMATELY CAUSED PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES.

We do not anticipate that there will be any contention made by defendants that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that defendant McKeever
was guilty of negligence as he drove his car in a northerly
direction and into the automobile of plaintiff.
By Instruction No. 4 ( 11-12) the trial court sub1nitted

two grounds of negligence. One was speed and the other
failure to keep a proper look-out.
The testimony established that the highway .at this
point was in a fifty mile speed zone (53). Defendant
McKeever admitted to the police officer that he 'vas
driving between fifty and sixty miles per hour. Under
applicable statutes this was prima facie evidenee that
~fel(eever vvas driving at .a speed which was not then
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reasonable, 1Jtah Code Annotated, 1953, section 41-6-46.
On his cross examination he adn1itted he knew he was
approaching a hill and knew that there was more danger
approaching a hill th.an merely driving along a straight,
level road ( 140). He took no precautions to bring his
car under control so that he could stop it within the range
of his vision. As a matter of fact, he clipped the· bumper
of another car which had previously stopped to permit
the police car to make the ""l--:-" turn- After clipping this
car, he "\Vent on into the other lane of traffic and into the
car driven by plaintiff. The statutes of this State require
that a driver shall drive at an appropriately reduced
speed when approaching a hill c.rest, l . . tah Code . .~
notated, 1953, section 41-6-46 (c).
The conduct of the driver, Joseph Breeze, indicates
that if defendant l\1cl(eever had been driving at a proper
speed and had been keeping a proper lookout he would
have been able to discern the situation that existed and
would h,a-ve been able to bring his automobile to a stop
short o ~ colliding with plaintiff.
The evidence shows that Breeze sa'v the police car
200 or 300 feet ahead of hin1, yet plaintiff laid down only
60 feet of brake 1narks indicating that l1e 1nust not have
been keeping a proper lookout or did not take steps to
bring his car under eontrol and reduce its speed to a
reasonable one under the facts and cireun1stances ,vhich
faced him.
We believe that there 'vas sufficient eYidence to subInjt to the jury the proposition that defendant nfc.Kee-
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ver was under the influence of intoxicating liquor and,
hence, was negligent in that regard. The evidence indicated that he talked thick, th.a.t he staggered a little and
that he smelled of liquor (53, 54). He believed that he
was at Draper and stated he had passed the point of
the mountain, when, as a matter of fact, he was t'venty
to twenty-five miles to the south of that point .and had
not reached the point of the mountain or Draper.
The evidence supports a finding of proxirnate cause.
If defendant had kept a proper lookout he would have
been able to stop or bring his car under proper control
and thus avoid the collision. A reasonable rate of speed
would have permitted him to bring his ear to a stop and
thus avoid the collision. This evidence supports a finding of proximate· cause.
We have concluded not to make any extensive arguments on this proposition. Our remembrance is that defendants did not contend an insufficiency of evidence to
support a finding of negligence on defendants' part and
proximate cause. However, we feel it necessary to refer
to this evidence because the trial court in granting the
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict did not
specify the particular ground upon which he ruled.
vVe submit the evidence supports a finding that defendants were negligent, proximately causing plaintiff's

. . .

illJUrleS.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING PLAINTIFF
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GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER
OF LAW.

The record does not indicate the ground upon which
the trial court ruled· Based upon comn1ents of the trial
court and the argument of counsel, it is our belief the
trial court ruled that plaintiff was guilty of negligence
as a matter of law and that such negligence as a matter
of law proximately caused plaintiff's injuries. Ordinarily,
these two questions are questions which should be submitted to a jury for its consideration. The burden of
proof, or as it is sometimes known, the burden of persuasion, is upon defendant to satisf3~ the jury by a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff was guilty of
negligence and that such negligence proxi1nately caused
her injuries.
The recent case of Coo1nbs r. Perry, 2 Utah 2d 38L
275 P. 2d 680 (1954) has 1nade a \ery clear statement
of the test ·w·hich must be applied to the endence here.
It is there stated:
"The test we apply is ,,. .hether from all of the
evidence re.asonable 1ninds could fairly say that
they were not convinced by a preponderance of
the evidence that she failed to use reasonable eare
under the circum~stances and that this resulted in
proximately contributing to cause her injury. Or,
to state the proposition affirn1atively was the
eviden:.e so clear and con1pelling that ~II reasonable minds 1nust say that it \vas established bv a
preponderance of the evidence that she \Yas negligent and that such was a proximate cause of her

injuries~"
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Also in Stickle v. Union Pacific Railroad Company,
(Utah) 251 P. 2d 867 (1952), the Court sert forth the
tests which should be used in considering a contention
such as is made by defendants in the case at bar:
"It should be kept in 1nind that so far as the
quantum of proof nece~ssary to t~ake the question
of contributory negligence from the jury is concerned, the tests are the same as with respect to
primary negligence. For instance, in a given case,
there may be some evidence upon which a finding
of negligence by the defendant could be b.ased, yet
the jury may remain in such a state of mind that
they may fairly say that they are not convinced
by preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was negligent, and based upon such failure
of proof may refuse to find a verdict against him.
It would only be when the defendant's negligence
had been established with such certainty that all
reasonable men must conclude that he did not
exercise re~asonable care, th:at the court would
rule .as a matter of law that he w.as negligent and
direct the jury to find a verdict against him;
conversely, if evidence were such that reasonable
men 1nay fairly s~ay that they are not convinced
from a preponder.ance of the evidence that he was
guilty of negligence, the court could not rule
that he was negligent as a matter of law and t1ake
the case from the jury.
"The·se principles apply in identical fashion
to the question of plaintiff's contributory negligence except that the defendant has the burden of
proof. That the evidence is such that the jury
may find from a preponderance of the evidence
that the plaintiff failed to use due care for his
own safe,ty is not sufficient. The proof must establish his failure to do so with such certainty that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
all reasonable minds must so conclude before the
court may rule as .a matter of law that he is precluded from recovery on that ground·"
We will treat each of these propositions separately
considering first the problem of negligence and second
the problem of proximate cause.
NEGLIGENCE
In Instruction No. 5 ( 13, 14), the trial court submitted to the jury two grounds of negligence. First, he
instructed the jury that if they found fro1n a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff attempted to make a
"U" turn on U. S. Highv•.,..ay 91, at the time and plaee
of the collision complained of, and upon the approach to
or near the crest of a grade where such vehicle could not
have been seen by the driver of any other vehicle approaching fron1 either direction \Yithin five hundred feet,
and that such turn could not be made or accomplished
with reasonable safety, then they could find that plaintiff
was negligent. The second proposition submitted to the
jury \vas that if the jury found, fron1 a preponderance of
the evidence, that plaintiff atte1npted to 1nake a ~'1?' turn
at the tune and place of the collision \vithout keeping a
proper lookout for other persons or n1otor vehicles la\vfully using said highway, then the jury might find that
plaintiff was negligent.
Section 41-6-67 Utah Code ..:.lnnotated 1953 provides
as follows:
"No veh_icle ~hall_ he turned so as to proceed
.
In the oppos1te d1rect1on upon any eurve, or upon
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the approach to, or near the crest of a grade,
vvhere such vehicle e>annot be seen by the driver of
any other vehicle approaching from either direction within 500 feet."
There -vvas no evidence in this case which required
a finding that plaintiff's automobile could not have been
seen by the driver of .any other vehicle approaching from
either direction within five hundred feet. There wa8
evidence that the place where the "U" turn was attempted
was anywhere from seventy-five feet to four hundred
feet from the crest of the hill. It did not appear that
the road south of the crest was on a downward grade
toward the south. In other words, the jury could have
found that as .a car \vas driving in a northerly direction
approaching the crest of the hill, it was on a plateau and
the view of such motorist would not necessarily be obscured for five hundred feet or more.
Also plaintiff was instructed by a police officer to
follow him and he would escort her .after he had put
the lights on the patrol ear and after there was a break
in the traffic. The officer turned on his lights, the traffic stopped and the officer made the "U'' turn followed
by plaintiff. The statute was not meant to cover a situ.ation such as this. A state strutute requires a motorist to
comply with any lawful direction of police officer. Section 41-6-13, Ut,ah Code Annotated, 1953.
ing
the
the
the

We submit there was no evidence requiring a findthat there was a violation of thrs st,atute and hence
matter should have been left to the determination of
jury.
Concerning her preparations to make the "U" turn,
testimony of plaintiff supports .a finding of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
ordinary care and hence the second ground of negligence
was a jury queistion. Plaintiff testified that while she
was on the side of the road the patrolman told her to
follow him. He put on the oscillating light on top of his
automobile and made ready to make the "U" turn. He
did not attempt to go in front of traffic until all traffic
had stopped, both northbound and southbound. When he
observed th~at he could turn in safety, he started to make
the "U" turn. Plaintiff followed. She stated that before she moved, she put on the signal light indicating she
was about to make a lefthand turn. She looked in both
directions and saw no auton1obiles '.vhich constituted a
danger. She then commenced to make the turn and after
she entered the high,vay, the automobile driven by l\fcKeever collided with her auton1obile on the left side
between the left rear door and the left rear fender.
Pl~aintiff's

.attention '\Yas demanded in more than one
direction and in n1ore than one place. Since her attention
could not be in all places and in all directions at once,
it was of necessity a question of hun1an judgment hO"w
her attention should be distributed an1ong the several
competing de1nands. Plaintiff had to look north~ soutl1
and west. It '-'"as for the jury to say '-'"'hether she used
reasonable c:are in distributing her attention.
This Court had held '.Yhere the attention of a nlotorist must be distributed over several directions whether
the motorist is negligent in her distribution is a question
of fact for the jury. In lllartin v. Stevens, (Utah) 243 P
2d 747, the collision occurred in an intersection and it
was held a jury question as to due care on plaintiff's p.art
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\Vas presented. Considering the distribution of attention the court s~ta ted :
"We must remember that there were three
other streets to give some attention to as he approached the intersection- All of the attention
could not very well or safely be focused on any
one at any given instant. Remaining aware of the
others and giving them secondary attention, the
plaintiff would look to the west, as he stated he
did, to observe for the favored traffic to which he
1nust give right of way, if any was near. He then
looked to the east and saw no car within the extent
of his vision, 150 to 200 feet. At th.a.t instant he
was entitled to assume, absent anything to warn
him to the contrary, that any car approaching
from that direction would do so at a lawful rate
of speed, that is, not ~to exceed about 25 miles per
hour. He then changed his main attention back
to the intersection and the south and west and proceeded. * *
•J(c

"As hereinabove suggested, we must avoid
measuring the plaintiff's duty and charging him
with negligence because he may have failed to
anticipate and avert negligence on the part. of
the defendant. We do not believe that it can he
said that all reasonable minds must agree that the
plaintiff's action in looking to the east and then
proce,eding, relying on his right of way over
traffic from that direction, and the assumption
that any such traffic would not exceed a re.asonable and lawful rate of speed, amounted to negligence on his part."
In Coombs v. Perry, 2 Utah 2d 381, 275 P 2d 680,
this Court considered this same question in a pedestrian
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cas.e but the same principle is applicable here. The court
stated:
"She must of course be w.atching for automobiles or other vehicles on the street, particularly
from the north whence traffic was most likely to
come. But due care requires that she also keep
a lookout ahead for other pedestrians, possible
holes or obstructions in the street, and at least
remain aware of the possibility of other traffic,
lest she be guilty of failing to use reasonable care
for her own safety in regard to other dangers.
For these reasons she obviously is not necessarily
required, and likely in due care cannot give her
entire at~tention to any one particular point of
hazard. All that is required of her is that she use
that degree of care which ordinary and reasonable
persons usually observe under such circmnstances.
"Under the evidence here the jury may well
have found that when the plaintiff looked to the
north there was no car approaching "ithin a
distance of in1mediate hazard to her, and in view
of the considerations .above discussed as to her
right-of-way, and the necessity of remaining aware
of other conditions around her~ that her conduct
in placing some reliance upon the observation she
made and proceeding 'Yest"~ard across the street
was consistent "'ith her dutY of ordinarY and reasonable care for her safety.~~
·

In Hayden v. Ceder.l~tnd. 1 lTtah 2d 171, 263 P. 2d
796 (1953), this Court refused to rule as n1atter of law
that it constituted negligence for a driver of an automobile to give a signal for a left-hand turn and not 1nake
any observation to the rear through a rear Yie"T 111irror
or otherwise. I-Iere plaintiff testified that she not only
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gave a signal, but that also she looked for both north
and south bound traffic.
The underlying reason for the ruling in the Hayden
case is that plaintiff took some preeaution for his safety
and whether it was enough to amount to reasonable care
was for the jury to decide. This principle is well established in this jurisdiction as is reflected in Stickle v.
Union Pacific R. Co., (Utah), 251 P 2d 867, where plaintiff tested the tie band which passed over the tanks on
a flat car by placing his weight upon it. He could have
done 1nore to wscertain i ts s~afe~ty. The court held the
question of whether he did enough was for the jury.
1

The case at bar is not one where plaintiff did nothing. She did something f~or her own safety and certainly went farther than did plaintiff in the Hayden case.
See also Lloyd v. Southern Pacific Co., 111 Cal App.
2d 626, 245 P. 2d 583, -vvhere it was held the evidence
established that the driver of an automobile· in a crossing accident had exercised some care and therefore the
question of contributory negligence was for the jury.
The court quoted at length from Koch v. Southern Calif·
Ry. Co., 148 Cal. 677, 84 P. 176, the 1naterial part of
which is as follows :

" * * * * where it is shown that a plaintiff has
exercised some care, the question whether or not
the care actually exercised was due and sufficient,
will always he a matter for determination by the
jury."
The court, referring to the Supreme Court, concluded:
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" * * * * It thus appears that that court has
now adopted or restated the rule of the Koch
case, and we of course are bound to follow it if
there is any evidence in this record that Lloyd
exercised some care - whatever the quantum
thereof."
We have here the evidence that the officer told plaintiff to follow hin1 in making the "U" turn. He n1ade it
successfully and plaintiff was merely following his lead,
which she could do as a reasonably pr11dent person.
While plaintiff testified she had no recollection of
seeing other cars stopped on the highway, the jury could
find she was actually R\Yare of them and because of being
distraught did not recollect their presence. In an~~ event,
seeing these cars stopped would give her added reason
to make the turn and would lead to .an assurance upon
which she could act as a reason·ably prudent person. In
Hardman v. Thurman, (lTtah) 239 P. 2d 215, plaintiff
driving south, made a left-hand turn in an intersection·
'llhere \vere three lanes for northbound traffic. In the
first two lanes east of the center line 'vere cars which
were stopped. Defendant 'vas driving north in the third
lane and collided 'vith plaintiff. The court held the question of plaintiff's negligence "~as one for the jury and
stated:
"In the instant case, the jury 1night reasonably conclude· that "?hen the tanker truck stopped
in the first lane east of tl1e center of State Street
and another motor vehicle stopped in the second
lane, Mrs. Hardman was in the exercise of reasonable care in assuming that it "~as safe to proceed
eastwardly."
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\Ve subrnit th:at plaintiff's negligence, if any, was a
question of fact t:o be determined by the jury. In this
very case the question was at first submitted to the jury
and the verdict for plaintiff established th.at eight citizens
of this community believed plaintiff was not guilty of
negligence.

PROXIMATE CAUSE
Even if we assume for the purpose of argument that
plaintiff was guilty of negligence as a matter of law,
still the trial court erred because proximate cause 1n
this case is a question of fact for the jury.

Hayden v. Cederlund, 1 Utah 2d 171, 263 P. 2d 796,
is very sin1ilar to the case at bar. There plaintiff's verdict was by the trial court set aside and a judgment notwithstanding the verdict entered for defendant. The
judgment was reversed and the verdict reinstated. Plaintiff 'vas riding in a truck 'vith his son driving. The
negligence of the son was imputable to plaintiff. The son
was driving at a speed of approximately 15 miles per
hour. The truck was hit in the rear by an automobile
driven in the same direction by a peace officer at a speed
of 45 or 50 miles per hour. The son testified he was going
to make a left hand turn and about 100 feet before making
the turn, he put out hi1s left ~arm, signaling the turn. Just
before he turned an automobile p.assed him on the right
side. The collision occurred as he commenced his turn
at a time he 'vas from 3 to 15 feet beyond the center line.
He heard no siren, saw no flashing light and did not look
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to the rear or through the rear vision mirror at .any
time after he signaled the turn. Defendant testified his
siren and red flasher were ~operating and he saw no signal
given by plaintiff's 1son. He was attempting to pass the
truck to the left. When he realized it was turning to the
left, he threvvr on his brakes .and laid do,vn 75 feet of
brake marks before the impact.
In holding that proximate cause -vvas a question of
fact the court stated :
"We have said that violation of a traffic law
constitutes negligence as .a 1natter of law, but
that such violation may not be the proximate cause
of an injury. Without determining the correctness
of the trial court's interpretation of the statute as
applicable to the facts here, we believe in error the
ruling that the driver's negligence, if any, because
of violation of the statute or independently thereof, "ras a proximate cause of the injury.
"Viewing the evidence favoring the plaintiff,
and recognizing that causation ordinarily is a
matter for the jury unless reasonable minds could
not differ as to its e:Aristence or the lack of it, we
believe and conclude that tl1ere "~ere facts here
relating to proxin1ate cause 'Yhieh~ if believed by
the jury, were such that rea'sonable 1ninds could
conclude that the end result 'Yas not efficiently
caused or concurred in by the driYer's negligence.
In this connection, a car passed on tl1e right just
before the atte1npted turn, 'vhich, along "~ith other
facts, may have given rise to a reasonable conclusion that those to the rear had seen and heeded
the driver's signal. It is not unreasonable to
anticipate th3::t no on~ 'vill atten1pt to pruss another
on the left 1n an Intersection. Althou(Yh
such
0
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anticipation of itself may not preclude a finding
of negligence in a given case, other facts, such as
the p.assing of a car to the right, failure of one
intending to pass to give an audible or visible
signal of such intention, the high speed of a car
approaching from the rear, physical facts which
may tend to show that one approaching from the
rear may have attemp,ted to ch.ange his course and
pass to the right of the truck (as another car a
moment before had done), but was unsuccessful
in the maneuver because of speed or miscalculation, in the aggregate may combine to make .a
f.actual situation essentially for the jury in conjunction with its privilege of appraising the credibility of the witnesses and the character of the
evidence.
"The jury resolved doubt in favor of the plaintiff, and with deference to the learned trial court''s
determination, we believe the f.acts do not demand
a finding, as a matter of law, that the jury's conclusion was unreasonable or unfounded on competent evidence."
Let us assume plaintiff did not keep a proper lookout. Had she looked properly she should have seen the
Breeze car and the southbound cars stopped. She would
have believed th.at traffic had seen the police· car and her
own and was giving them an opportunity to make the
turn. The speed of the defendant''s auto1nobile and his
failure to keep a lookout could have been regarded as the
sole proximate cause of the collision.
Another case closely analagous to this c.ase is Lowder v· li alley) 120 lJtah 231, 233 P. 2d 350 (1951). Plaintiffs 'vere in an automobile driven by one of them in a
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westerly direction and as he approached an intersection,
he slowed to 10-15 miles per hour, looked north and south
and saw no automobile. Defendant was driving his truck
south and it hit the rear right side of plaintiff's automobile. A verdict and judgment for plaintiffs were affirmed. Defendant argued plaintiffs were guilty of contributory negligence as matter of law. The court stated·
"Appellants strenuously argue that respondent Amasa Lowder's contributory negligence precludes both him and his wife from any recovery
for damages and injuries. They argue that he
failed to look and see Ruth Holley's truck before
he entered the intersection and l1ad he looked he
would have seen the truck and it would have been
his duty to refrain from entering the inte-rsection
until he could do so safely. Appellants are correct
in stating that before entering an intersection the
driver of a car must look and determine whether it
is safe to enter. However, under the facts as the
court found them, had Amasa Lowder observed
the truck just before he entered the intersection
he would have been justified in considering it safe
to enter because .at that point, if tl1e truck \Yas
being driven at the rate of 50 1niles per hour, and
Amasa Lowder was driving at from 5 to 10 miles
per hour, as the trier of the facts could reasonably
have found, then the truck "rould haYe been at
least 250 feet fron1 the intersection since his car
had traveled .ahnost the entire distance across
the intersection before the in1paet, and this being
so he could have assumed and acted on the assumption that the driver of the truck would exercise ordinary and reasonable care in its driving
and that it \vould be safe to cross the intersection.
Had Ruth Holley exercised such reasonable and
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ordinary care the collision would not have occurred. Under such a state of facts Amasa Lowder's
failure to see the truck could in no way have contributed to the accident. The court, therefore, did
not err in finding that Amasa Lowder was not contributorily negligent."
This quotation is clearly ,applicable to the case at bar.
If plaintiff had seen the defendant's car some 300 or 400
feet to the south, with other cars stopped, she could have
assumed he \Vould also bring his car to a stop and could
consider it safe to make the turn. Had the defendant1s
here exercised reasonable care as did the other drivers,
the collision \vould not have occurred. According to the
Lowder case, this being so, proximarte causation was a
question for the jury and defendants' negligence could
have been the sole cause.
In Gibbs v. Blue Cab, (Utah) 249 P. 2d 213 (on rehearing 259 P 2d 294), a cab collided \vith a bicycle.
The rider of the bicycle w.as held by the trial court to be
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law because he had no lamp on his bicycle. The Supreme Court
reversed. It held this was a violation of a city ordinance
and a state statute "which established some negligence as
a matter of law." The court then held proximate caus.e.
was a question of fact, stating:
"Assuming that in one aspect, by showing a
violation of the city ordinance, defendant established ~some negligence on the part of deceased
as a matter of law, the problem remains .as to
whether absence of the lamp under all the facts
was or was not a contributing proximate cause
of the collision, - particularly in view of the fact
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that immediately prior to the time of ?np.act the
bicycle, and therefore the lamp, was pointed a:vay
from the vision of the defendant-a proper Jury
question.
"We are committed to the principle that matters of negligence, contributory negligence and
proximate cause generally are jury questions, unless the evidentiary facts are of such conclusive
character as to require all reasonable 1ninds to
conclude that the ultimate fact of negligence, contributory negligence or proximate cause does or
does not exist."
This court considered whether proxin1ate cause was
a jury question in Hess v. Robinson,. 109 lltah 60, 163
P. 2d 510 (1945). The trial court instructed the jury
that both plaintiff and defendants \Yere guilty of negligence as matter of la\Y but left to the jury the question
of proximate cause. The jury returned a verdict for
plaintiff. Defendants contended that the negligence of
plaintiff was a proxin1ate cause of his injury as 111atter
of la-\v. The verdict for plaintiff \Yas affirmed.
Plaintiff was driving a truck south on an arterial
highway. Defendants \\Tere driving an .a1nbulance east
on an intersecting street. The court instructed the jury
that plaintiff was negligent in not looking. In distinguishing proxiinate cause and ren1ote cause the court stated:
"By 'proxim·ate cause' is intended an act
which directly produced, or coneurred dirertlv in
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tended that which may have happened and yet no
injury has occurred, notwithstanding that no injury could have occurred if it had not happened."
It then started the consideration of whether plaintiff's negligence was a proxi1nate eause of the injuries
.as 1natter of law by asking the following questions:
"'The trial court instructed the jury that the
plaintiff w.as negligent in not so looking. But does
it follow as beyond dispute that had plaintiff
looked and seen the ambulance approaching, reasonable and prudent conduct would have dictated
that he stop until the ambulance had crossed the
intersection~ Are the f.acts revealed by the evidence so clear and certain that the court could say
that for plaintiff to drive into the intersection
without stopping was not the act of an ordinarily
prudent and careful man~"

Asking and answering these same questions in the
case at b.ar the same ans-vvers \Vould be forthcoming. If
plaintiff had looked and had seen the oncoming defendants' c.ar, she could have concluded that it would stop
as had the other cars. The police car had made the turn
in safety. It is not beyond dispute that had plaintiff
looked and seen defendants' car approaching, reasonable
;,. prudent conduct would have dictated she not make the
;- turn. The evidence is not so clear and certain that the
m: court could say that for plaintiff to ~start the turn was not
~~~ the act of an ordinarily prudent and careful person.

1:

Similar reasoning prevailed in Martin v. Stevens,
(lTtah) 243 P. 2d 747, where proximate cause was held
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to be a jury question. Plaintiff drove south and defendant
west into an intersection. Defendant hit plaintiff broadside in the intersection. Plaintiff only saw defendant
when the brakes were set just before the collision. The
trial court granted defendants' motion to dismis'S and this
was reversed. The court stated:
"There is .also the question of proximate cause.
Should we assume that all reasonable men must
conclude that plaintiff's failure to keep more of a
lookout to the east amounted to negligence, would
they also all agreei that such failure to observe
proximately caused the collision~ Suppose he had
looked continuously to the east as he approached
and proceeded into the intersection and had seen
defendant coming. Could he not, within the limits
of reasonable care, have assumed defendant would
slow up and yield the right of 'Yay, or would the
defendant's speed and proximit:~ to the intersection have been a 'varning to the plaintiff that he
would not do so~ l~ nder the rulings in Hess v.
Robinson; Lowder v. Holley; and Poulsen v. Manne,ss, all cited above, this was also a jury question."
L.

Other cases 'vhich support plaintiff's position are
Dieckmann v. Signorini, 47 Cal. App. 2d 481, 118 P. 2d
319; Shattuck v. Picku·ick Stages Corp., 135 Kan. 602, 11
P. 2d 996; Ford v. TVilson, 107 Cal. App. 131, 290 Pae.
120; Burns v. Stan.dring, 1-1-S ''"rash. 291~ 268 Pac. 866.
We subrnit the evidence here supports a finding that
if defendant nicKeever had reduced his speed as he
should have done upon co1ning toward the crest of the hill
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

31
.and kept a proper lookout as he should have done and attenlpted to bring his automobile under control before
he did, this collision would never have occurred. We
believe that under the authorities such a finding would
permit the jury to also find that the negligence of defendant was the sole proximate cause of the collision and that
the negligence, if any, of plaintiff was the remote cause,
if a cause at all.
CONCLUSION
A jury of eight citizens of Salt Lake County concluded that under the instructions of the court the defendants were negligent and the plaintiff was not guilty
of contributory negligence. The trial court saw fit to
exerci se his power to nullify that determination. In so
1

doing he has set his mind against eight minds on a factual determination. The exercise of such power is a serious course to pursue in the orderly trial of a law suit.
It should only be done with great hesitation.
We believe and submit that the trial court has denied to plaintiff her right of

tri~al

by jury and that he has

usurped the function of the jury. Under the foregoing
authorities and argument the question of negligence,
proximate causation and contributory negligence were
all questions for the jury and the jury determination
should have been respected and held to have been supported by the testimony in this case.
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vV e respectfully ask that this Court reinstate the
verdict of the jury and recognize ·and uph·old the function
of the jury which it properly exercised in this case.
We respectfully rusk this court to reverse the judgment of no cause of action and remand the case to the
District Court with instructions to reinstate the verdict

and enter judgment for plaintiff in the sum of $5,199.90.

Respectfully submitted,

RAWLINGS, \\:""ALLACE,
ROBERTS & BLACK
Counsel for Appellant
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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